tv World War I Navy CSPAN June 17, 2017 2:00pm-3:52pm EDT
c-span, where history unfolds daily. in 1970 nine, c-span was created as a public service by america's cable television companies and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. >> next come by u.s. naval academy professor james rentfrow explains how the navy evolved the 20 years between the spanish-american war and world of 1916en the naval act introduced submarines. the smithsonian posted this event. tfromobbins: captain ren earned a bachelors degree in naval science.
in january, 1991, he reported to the vikings. he was deployed around the world, overseeing training and combat ready status of reserve aircrew. he also took part in the .peration deliberate force he also deployed to the arabian of and gulf in support operation iraqi freedom and enduring freedom. 2008, he was selected to into the permanent military professor program and is currently the associate chair of the history -- the department of history at the u.s. naval academy. he earned his phd from the university of maryland at college park.
please join me in welcoming professor rentfrow. [applause] professor rentfrow: great. things very much, ruth. can everybody hear me? am i on? great. tfrow.ren more funises to be than convincing a class of sleepy midshipman that the rise of nationalism in the 20th century is important. about forward to talking one of my favorite subjects, which is naval history. the lawyers tell me that i must point out that i am i in fact on leave and i am civilian -- i am in civilian clothes and my views do not represent the views of the government, the navy, anyone else he would like to associate me with. what i thought we would do this evening, i see three parts to the talk i would like to give. i think it is important to spend
some time talking about how a modern fleet developed as opposed to squadrons or teams.ual we will talk a little bit about examples of fleet warfare, something new at the turn of the 20 century and then we will turn our attention to the united states navy itself after the spanish-american war until the first world war. what was the geopolitical situation? the great white fleet. there's lots and lots to talk about, and finally, the first world war itself, where we will find most of the important things we had to do dealt with convoy escort and also integrating battleships. i will tell you, it is a shame en only getdshipm
about a day on the first world war. when we are moving them through the american naval history class, we are moving at such a clip and have so many important things to talk about, and of course i have to get to midway and iwo jima and vietnam and some of these things are it so, frankly the first world war for the americans does not have any good sea battles, does not have any memorable catchphrases, things like that, so we tend to run through it quickly with them, but it is a very rich history and there's a lot there and a lot of things that can help us understand the development of the u.s. navy as a modern war fighting organization. a little bit about me. as ruth said, i graduated from in 1989. academy you would be surprised how often i get asked -- i did not realize you could go to the naval academy and become a college professor. the answer to that is, no, you can't. the first 18 years of my career,
i was a fairly normal aviator kind of guy. right about now, my classmates are commending aircraft carriers. that is where the class of 1989 is in our development and i then have been more happy to do that, but the navy had other ideas. so i got sent off to school to give lectures instead. as ruth said, i graduated in 2012 got assigned to the naval academy as a permanent professor. once we stopped moving, and my family moved 11 times while i was an operational officer. my girls. normal people moved every cheat years. my wife said -- my girls thought that normal people moved every two years. my wife said we should get more involved in the community. i thought she meant volunteer at a soup kitchen. no, she met the come foster parent spirit which we did. if you want to smithsonian lecture on the opioid crisis in anne arundel county, i can give
that one, to you will, but i like to tell people that we are the world's worst foster parents. the idea is to love them and let them go. we love them and adopt them. which is not a sustainable model. [laughter] we have a few more kids. it either keeps me young or will put me in an early grave. i do have a five-year-old editor 22-year-old. in the middle of all that, i wrote a book. do have a five-year-old and a 22-year-old. the subject of the book is the development of fleet tactics and organization and strategy in the period between the civil war and the spanish-american war. how do we go to having ships that fought in the spanish-american war and specifically, how did those guys learn to fight together as a squadron rather than just, single ship action question mark
a couple of shifts? my interestreally in the area of naval history. i sort of hope that the next project is going to sound a little bit like the specter we have tonight. continues. we go from having a squadron -- which is what my book is about -- to building a fleets. how do we have a fleet organization, fleet tactics? that sort of thing. that is the question for us. how does the relative limited regional navy become a world-class navy capable of great britain's grand fleet in less than 20 years? let's talk about tactics and matériel first. here's a nice picture of not be great white fleet, but our very first steel ships, the so-called
abcd ships. which were in interesting collection. you can see if you look at these guys -- they have a full sail rig. these are not emergency sales like you can deploy the sales if we need to. they are an actual sail rig. but they had premodern engines. they had fairly modern free-floating rifle weapons, but they were slow and they were not armored. so, they were not really designed to fight other ships. what they were really designed to do was go out and pray on merchant shipping and that sort of thing. however, they were too slow to be good cruisers. what we did with these ships is we form some think of the squadron of evolution and we drove them around together and this is the first time the u.s. navy -- this is an 1889, the this is in 1889,
this is the first time the u.s. navy worked on how to we fight together as a squadron? opposed to single ships. this is one of the reasons i find this time fascinating. things are changing very, very quickly. combat in the age of sail largely involved being at either point-blank range, or at the very most, perhaps at 300 yards. contrary to what you might see in the movies, wooden ships don't really sink your it being, you know, made of wood. era navalf premodern warfare was to disable the other ship, which they would do very effectively by shooting at the rigging and kill everybody you could on the decks, right question mark so you could board them, kill everybody else, and capture the ship. sinking the ship was not really what these folks were out to do and that's not really what the
weapons were designed for. now, occasionally, you get a spark down into a powder magazine or something, and the ship might blow up. the generally, you captured these things. industrialization is going to change that. couple things are going to happen simultaneously. the first two here are the ones that are important. rifling, of course extends the range. now instead of 200, 300 yards, we could be talking three miles, 3000 yards. and the guns are going to start to get larger. and at the same time, we are .oing to develop armor not only are we moving further away from our targets, but our targets are armored, so therefore, we better have a bigger gun, because we are trying to penetrate this armor, but we can get further away from it. you see how this gets into a dual very quickly, right? we have a problem in the late
19th century. i will talk about this when i talk briefly about the lessons from the spanish-american war. the defense has the advantage. we've got the ships. they've got armor on them. our guns really are not good enough to hit the armor very accurately because we have not developed fire control yet. that is going to come later. the 20thrning point of century you still left folks looking down the gun barrel saying, we will shoot over there. and the hit rate is abysmal, something on the order of 3% of shipsells fired hit other . until we have better fire control computers, as we roll into the 19th century, we have to come up with some other form of ships. some bright individual thought,
what if we put a hole where there isn't any armor? underneath the ship. of course, i'm talking about a torpedo. , perfectedad torpedo in the 1860's, the navy glamis on to that same design, and sounds the naval torpedo station in newport in 1869, and we begin to experiment with these things. that navy gloms on to same design. what if a little boat built very, very cheaply with a couple of torpedoes on it, because quite frankly, they will not cost that much to build, what if multimillion dollar warship with a couple torpedoes? this is the kind of stuff that kept planners up late at night.
this means all sorts of things for tactics. we have decided we need to flight as a -- fight as a fleet or a squadron. everybody is being together and we need to concentrate our firepower. that is important. that is how we prevail at sea. if someone shoots a torpedo spread at this closely concentrated formation, that causes problems. you need to be able to send signals to communicate to say, hey, we all need to turn left now or turn right now or do something to get away from these torpedoes. when i talk about the battle of jutland in a few slides, you will see how this becomes important. it does one other thing. notbig battleships could
really participate -- they have these egg guns firing at ranges of three miles. underneath the fire of the big guns. what you going to do? well, the answer would be you send out a torpedo boat and destroyer. then, of course, eventually, we quit calling them torpedo .oat destroyers eventually they will get a very important mission and that is a big part of our story this evening. the navy purchased its first submarine in 1900. we thought that submarines would be useful for harbor defense. they were really seaworthy. the idea was you could park a
couple of these outside of our someonet harbors and if tried to shell these harbors, they could start lobbing torpedoes into them and that would be an effective way to defend the harbors. he is riding about how we need to have a big fleet, he needs to because and traded together -- writing about how need of a big and boy, the submarine just sort of passed him. he was very down on commerce raiding. thisurse, he experienced in the civil war. it did not work in the civil war. the submarine is going to change the game there for sure. back to our great big rifle guns that can't hit anything.
what are we going to do about that? here is a guy named william s. sims. i don't have a picture of him as a lieutenant. at this point in our lecture, he is a lieutenant. he has his admiral stars. we will see him later. but right now, he is over in the asiatic squadron in the far east, and he is hobnobbing with all of the british officers in officersast as naval were want to do. and they would talk about fire control methods. in particular, there was the naval officers got, -- officer scott. and he had developed something called continuous aim firing.
i don't want to bore you with .he details it would involve positioning the gun and yanking on the lanyard, which is -- what naval warfare would look like in the 1700s and 1800s and that was essentially what we were still doing. point the gun where you want it to go. the gun operators were pointing a gun. the british operators were using it with some success. sims took this back to the united states navy and said, we've been talking to these guys out in the far east and we think that you ought to give this a shot. with my colleagues' aversion to any change, they said, no, thanks. we will pass on that. this is an interesting story because this could never happen now, but 1902, you could get away with a sort of thing.
sims wrote theodore roosevelt and said, hey, mr. president. mr. president, i know how much you love the navy, and i have this great idea for how we could be more combat effective. the folks in washington are not listening to it. so theodore roosevelt promptly made him director of target practice for the united states navy and within three years the navy had instituted this system of continuous aim firing all through the fleet with good results. and he held that post for seven years. inspector of target practice. all right, so all of this means what. flotilla tactics. your fleet is not only going to have a line of dreadnoughts or big battleships -- we will talk about what a dreadnought is. there will be a line of
destroyers trying to protect you from the enemy's destroyers. have three or four you getor 10 -- how do a hold of all of these things. this is really the question as we roll into the 20th century. i think this is a subject that has not been written enough about. how did these guys work these things out? one of the things i know that they did was use destroyers up in narragansett bay to practice fleet tactics during the turn of the century. i will come back to the story later. only think about the naval war college, we always think of them in terms of studying strategy -- ideas about seapower and naval
lewis, thed stephen admiral who founded the naval war college always envisioned college to be a laboratory of practice. you would be thinking about this strategy, but also figuring out ways to enact it, right? they really were at the turn of the century in they were working on this stuff. which brings us to the japanese. my be saying to yourself, the japanese? i thought this was about the united states navy in the first world war. yeah, but if we are going to learn lessons about how fleets fight, we need to look at these early actions. there were a couple battles
between modern battleships. tsushima is the first major fleet battle between pre-draw ships and-dreadnought it helps us understand what is going on as we rolled toward the first world war. out of all of the stuff i've been talking about for the last were nots, planners really certain what a battle between armored ships was going to look like. they did not have many examples. of course, everybody has heard of the monitor and the merrimack, right? that,ssons learned from the cannon balls bounced off each other's armor. a draw.le was they did not learn much from it.
maybe a torpedo was the answer. maybe ramming the other ships. and ramming the other ships, maybe that might be the answer. that, incidentally, is why if -- if yout pictures look at what a modern ship's all , the warships from this area is kind of backwards. the idea was you had a bunch of holes with this thing. that brings us to the battle of tsushima. in case you are not familiar with the story -- and i do not want to spend a lot of time here -- here is my laser pointer -- this is the russo japanese war, fighting5, a lot of
taking place. in manchuria, a lot taking place. things are not going well for the russians. the decision is made that the theirns need to reinforce positions and the idea is to fleet over toc meet them. so the admiral is told to take his baltic fleet and join it and bloody bus stop. did not give them permission to sail through the suez canal. that meant they had to go the around africa.
the russians are in poor matériel condition. of course, the men have been at for months. anyone in the navy will tell you if you are trying to make good , you have time to train. all you are doing is sailing at full speed. i can't tell you how many times the commander has gripes about sailing into the wind and they leave the room and leave us officers to fight it out. but all right -- what was i talking about? into frenchto indochina. vladivostok.ed for
it is a peer. he has two choices. he can go around the japanese islands or take the streak root through -- the straight route through tsushima. going to meet the japanese anyway. he heads for the straits of tsushima. he is met their by admiral togo. t-o-g-o. emperore confused by tojo. they still get it wrong on tests. go have a lot of advantages, write? number one, he had not been at sea for seven months. his base was right here. all he had to do with zip and -- was sick and crossed the tea or cut off the advancing columns of the russian fleet and as a
matter of fact, that is precisely what he does. this is important. he lies is the superior speed of the japanese ships to put himself in a position where he is ahead of the columns. annihilate is not the right word. but he destroys several of their ships. incidentally, tsushima, the last time a capital warship has surrendered on the high seas. in general, they sink or are abandoned. he cuts off the advance and effectively decimates the russian fleet. spent enoughly time on the battle portion of this. naval tacticians learned three things. big guns to work if they are shot directly. we will talk more about that in a minute. but the decisive weapon -- and planners were not sure if the
ramming would be the decisive weapon or torpedoes. there were several torpedoes fired during tsushima. or maybe something else. what was the decisive weapon? gunsushima, definitely big are the decisive weapon. speed is a big deal. togo wins because of speed. ahead of themself russian advance. and guys were practicing working on wedge shaped formation and all kinds of echelon formations, all kinds of wacky things, trying to figure out how to best use the guns. the good old-fashioned line ahead formation, the same thing that nelson used is the thing that works really well. i make my students learn about tsushima, because these are the big lessons of 1905 we carry
forward. a ship gave its name to an entire type of battleships and that is the hms dreadnought. she was ordered, built, launched, and commissioned in 14 months. it's interesting. we will have another picture in a minute. she was ordered earlier because they were all getting the idea at the same time, right? the british decided they wanted -- this was to the royal navy's detriment. the launch of the dreadnought in 1906 made all of the other ships in the grand fleet obsolete that same day.
so, they were victims of their own success in that they have to turn around and start a very ambitious program very quickly. they talk about why do we call this class of ship dreadnoughts, right? warshipso are building , they are sort of the big trifecta. there is armor, speed, and big guns to read in general, you can have two of the three things when you are designing a warship . if you're going to have heavy armor and take guns, we call that heavy armor because they are slope. we call those battle cruisers. dreadnought gets all three. how does she do it? turbine asthe steam triple expansion
engines and use up to this time. i know, my students looked the same way -- the titanic, the -- then the engine room triple expansion engine. giant giant, weigh a lot, take up a lot of room -- very inefficient. a turbine, where the steam just sort of spins the wheel is smaller, more compact, and produces better horsepower -- more horsepower in less room and less weight, right? the dreadnought has turbine engines, can go faster, weighs less. the other thing that is important about the dreadnought is it has an all the gun armament. pre-dreadnought battleships usually had a mix. typically for -- two in front, two and back -- big guns.
typically at this time, big is 12 inch. they would have a few smaller six or eight inch guns, and these would be mixed all throughout the ship, so they would fire all these things. nobody knew exactly which gun , and it becamet increasingly difficult, -- remember because i referred to smokeless powder. we have not invented smokeless powder yet. it became increasingly difficult to know which guns were doing what. when we get the idea that big naval guns do work and that we are going to use destroyers, probably, and to engage all of those torpid alerts -- we are not going to try to shoot at them with our secondary battery. so why don't we just do away
with having a big secondary battery, and why don't we just have the armament the all big ? s -- big guns and moreover, let's put them on the centerline. better stability. this is what dreadnought does. she's got 1012-inch guns mounted on the centerline and a revolutionized ship design. ok. of theht i had a picture south -- maybe the south carolina is when i talk about the united states navy. i use jutland as an example. the outcome, which is more or , although the germans go back to their base and don't really come out again except for maybe one more time,
so strategically, it is more of a win with british, but the battle itself is more of a draw. i use it to talk to the midshipmen about the difficulties of command and control and how fleets have gotten so large and complex that the or ferrets health, when it actually happens, is actually not very decisive -- the warfare itself, when it actually happens, is actually not very decisive. es are down here. germans will come through the canal. great britain and scotland are over here. grand fleet is going to come down this way. germans are going to come up this way, and we are going to engage in combat. the british battle cruisers and german battle cruisers. the job of a battle cruiser was to scout. again, this is in an era -- i was the combat direction center officer of an aircraft carrier, so i owned the combat direction
center, and you would sit there with our giant screens and computers, you know where everything is, and in an era ,here none of this exists finding and fixing the enemy is 75% of your battle problem. 25% is actually hitting them with your guns. how do you find the enemy? that is the job of a battle cruiser. over here on the left, notice his nice, six-button, double-breasted jacket. the british noncommissioned officers wore the six buttons and traditionally, british officers wore the eight-button double-breasted coat. americans, when we got over there, we liked david beatty. he was a dashing guy, and we liked the look with the six-button jacket, and adapted that to our uniform. he is the head of the battle
cruisers, and admiral hipper is the head of the german scouting battle cruisers, and the fleet itself -- there is admiral jellico on the left. they have their british grand fleet. and admiral scheer on the right. . total of 259 ships engaged the battle itself breaks out into basically four phases. make them learn it. i have to write me an essay. quickly, the battle cruisers are the ones that actually find each other, right? jellico and the rest of the british fleet are of here. scheer and the rest of the german fleet are down here, and here are the battle cruisers that find each other at about 3:30 the afternoon on may 31, 1916, and they start shooting at each other. around and, he turns
starts moving to the south. he is trying to draw the british down because he know his fleet is coming up from the south, and he wants to draw them into a trap. so the battle cruisers tangle for a little while. -- and i know this slide is kind of easy. i understand it is difficult to make sense of. i still have a hard time making sense of it even though it is my slide, right? whoops, did not want that. here comes admiral jellico. this is the important point i wanted to make for today's lecture. he is arranged in column. this is exactly how the infantry works, by the way, you think about the civil war, they are all marching in columns. what do they have to do when
they get to the battlefield? they've got to fan out so they can bring their rivals to bear. this is the exact same thing. is frantic.his time he knows the germans are coming up from the south, but he does not know where they are in relation to him. that was important because if he deploys to the right and the germans are over here, he is going to take what we call in the navy raking fire. it's being shot at from the side. we don't want that. we want to deploy either right or left, and he has to know how to spread his columns out, so he is frantically sending flag signals asking where is the enemy. wayty says "he is over that ," but in an era before things like we have today like, i don't know, gps, beatty did not know where he was.
time to do this astrological stuff that they taught you 30 years ago. i used to be able to go out with a sextant and do that. there was no time for that. beatty did not know where he was. all he could say was they are over there, so jellico makes perhaps the single most important decision on the spot made by the royal may be in the entire first world war, i would say, and he deploys his fleet to the port, to the left, and it turns out to be exactly correct, right? here come the germans, and he effectively crosses their teeth. scheer realizes he is outgunned and outnumbered. the germans are shooting better than the british are, but he is outnumbered, so he knows he needs to turn away. -- let mes perfectly
see it i can get this right. you know what? i cannot say it. the german have such great military words. long word iny german, and i don't speak german, that means battle about turn, and this is what he executes. and he executes it using wireless. this is one of the first times in combat that wireless is used to give an order in combat, and battleecute this flawlessly. -- germans after the war they came to newport and were hanging out with us. we don't have independent confirmation of this, and there are scholars that think maybe germans were just being nice, but the germans claim they had studied the stuff the destroyers were doing in newport before the first world war, practicing those fleet tactics,
and that was what gave them the idea to practice this battle .urnabout and it had to be rigorously practiced, and they were very good at it. in some small way, the war college helped out admiral shia that day. but he goes on to actually -- i want to move on from talking about jutland, but i will say that again, the two fleets get into it. admiral scheer does another about turn again, and he eventually escapes to the south, crosses behind the grand fleet at night. they cannot see each other. there is some shooting between the rear of the grand leet in the van of the germans, but they make it back to their base. so what do we learn from the battle of jutland then? it is the culminating surface
action, so all of this work we in trying to do to figure out what battle between armored warships would look like, battles between battleships, dreadnought battleships and pre-dreadnought battleships and torpedo flotillas and battle cruisers and was one better than the other -- there has just been so much labor put into what this might look like. jutland is the culminating peer the all of this takeaway, frankly, is that the scope and scale of a major fleet action was such that it actually hindered close engagement. the british had a lot of deficiencies in their gunnery. we can get into some of that, what they were doing to try to shoot faster. the shells themselves did not pierced german armor effectively. beyond that, jutland has very few of writing lessons to teach, although i will point out that the naval war college studied the battle incessantly during
the interwar era instead of studying things like -- i don't know -- naval aviation. the game room is a lounge for the international students today, but you can go there and still see the checkerboard floor if you lift up the carpet in the corner where they would practice the battle of jutland over and over and over again with all the naval war college students. but our next fleet engagement will not be between battleships. it will be between aircraft carriers beyond visual range of each other. it is a very quick look, a very brief look. those of you that know anything about the subject know that i
have skimmed over a lot of things, but that is kind of the , forf the land for tactics weapons, as we turn to the 20th century and move to the first world war. i will move on now to talk a little bit about the united states navy. on the eve of the war of 1898, we have four first-class battleships. i usually immediately get asked what makes something a first-class battleships are he is the ability to withstand a hit from your own guns. if you were to design and armor such that you could fight with yourself essentially, that is a first class battleship. armor isass, if you're not quite thick enough to withstand an impact from your own guns and so on and so forth. the main is one of these. the texas is the other. the authority to give orders rests with the civilian
secretary of the navy. slide where i'm going to come back to this point, but i will just make it now to start with. pentagon where we have and things like dust this just .lows my students' minds the assistant secretary of the navy -- famously theodore roosevelt, but there were others . that was the operational staff of the united states navy. trust me -- i have seen all these letters. a, you wille shift go from point a to point b, and your people will pick up a load go tol at point c and point d. it is not a very efficient way to do business, certainly not if
you're fleet is growing. the navy goes through a lot of growing pains at the turn-of-the-century as we grapple with how you balance the civilian control of the military, which we are kind of into in the united states, with having military officers that can make decisions and make the trains run on time, right? this continues to be an issue for the u.s. navy we're going to get to it in a slide here in a minute, but this is kind of the state of the u.s. navy on the eve of the spanish-american war. it is a squadron navy. we have not yet created fleets that are made up of a line of battleships and some battle cruisers and destroyers and a submarine or two. we have not created fleets yet with four-star fleet commanders. we have a series of squadrons. one of them is the one i study in my book. the north atlantic squadron. there was a south atlantic squadron, and asiatic squadron,
a mediterranean squadron, and so on and so forth. that is really the largest fighting unit the u.s. navy has experimented with at this point, the squadron-level operations. in the spanish-american war, we had two major naval battles to look at. the first is the battle of manila bay. war is declared on april 25, and the first engagement of the spanish-american war takes place in manila on the first of may. i always ask students what the war was about, and after some hemming and harding, generally, i can get them to come up with the idea that it was cuba that was a problem -- after some hemming and hauling -- after someing and hawin -- after hemming and hawing. the night as they to explain why the first battle took place in
the philippines. they cannot. really, just because that's where the spanish squadron was. if the spanish question had been somewhere else, the admiral would have gone somewhere else to engage them, but the fact of the matter was they were hanging out in manila bay. the commander of the spanish squadron had made the probably correct decision to fight from anchor. , if youremodern era knew you had mobility issues, and you knew that you were on the defensive and the right was going to have to come to you -- in other words, somebody else initiative,nsive then fighting from anchor was not a bad strategy. these gunsy because cannot really hit anything in 1898, so if you are not moving, that helps your gunnery.
your gun platform is not moving. you can maybe shoot a little better. unfortunately, though, rather than anchoring under the guns of the fort that protects manila, he made the probably courageous to anchor at a place where he is not mutually supported by the spanish guns at the fort in manila so the battle takes place away from the city. they have to sit and watch while admiral dewey and his six ships, led by the olympia -- here is the olympia in our picture -- basically do -- i think it is six passes past the spanish fleet and decimate them all. for a guy like me trying to study tactics and organization and signals, doing flies one signal during the battle of manila bay.
follow the movements of the guy -- he was the guy, right? so that is where everybody did. there is almost nothing to be learned from the battle of manila bay. the other big one happens in cuba on the third of july, 1898. this is cuba in the background. she is trying to escape. to describe the entire battle because i'm afraid that would get us a little bit the battle of santiago de cuba is essentially a chase action. the spanish are attempting to run away. the americans, who were at like the spanish are leaving, and it was a giant kerfuffle. there are two of the american battleships, almost ran into each other.
brooklyn and oregon. to. and emergency back her engine's to not run over the brooklyn as they frantically scramble to try to go after the spanish, which they do eventually, but there are i think two signals flown at santiago. general chase is one of them, and engaged the enemy more closely. i think nelson flew that one at trafalgar. so that is it. why am i saying all this? i'm saying the outcomes of the war of 1898 in terms of tactics, strategy, how the united states navy is going to fight as a fleet moving into the 19th century -- we really do not learn anything. our ships to do, in fact, prevail in both of these engagements. the engagement of manila really was more target practice than actual combat engagement, and the engagement of santiago de
cuba was just a crazy free-for-all, but, fortunately, we managed to get a few hits on some of their ships. the gunnery was abysmal. we will talk more about that and a minute and what we're going to do to work on that. .% hit rate i'm going to make up a number. about 1200 shells were fired by the united states navy at .anila, and 3% were hit you can do the math on that. for the world war i navy that we are about to talk about, the spanish-american war a good newsll story. you know who it was not a good news story for? the army. they were abysmal. the army per warmed very poorly in the spanish-american war, but the navy overall had these two big battles where they had sunk all the opposing ships and the public and congress just could
not get enough of the navy. it was definitely a good time to be in the navy. among the other many things that was, of threw money at course, the u.s. naval academy. if you visit the grounds today and look at those beautiful, big buildings, those were all paid for with post spanish-american war money. however, we did -- if we wanted to a knot, and that could be a whole other lecture, so we could have a lecture on should the united states have annexed the philippines, yes or no, go, but we will not do that right now. the navy was kind of iffy on the whole thing. what did that mean? if we own the philippines now, the sort of means the navy has a problem. we have to take care of them. the acquisition of overseas colonies in the pacific really
double down on the fact that we are going to have new responsibilities for the navy in both the atlantic and the pacific. it makes it doubly important the idea of the passage through the business of panama -- the isthmus of panama. that could be another great lecture, the digging -- the taking of panama and the digging of a canal through there. we want to be able to concentrate our fleet so if we're going to have navy ships with response abilities in the pacific and navy ships that have responsibilities in the atlantic, if we go to war with a great naval power like great kind of who we still off and on thought we would fight a war with at this time, you would certainly need to have a way to get the entire fleet together. trust me, going around south america is not the answer, as the uss oregon found out. ok. all of this brings us to discuss -- i don't think i have a
picture of tr himself. well, i have this picture. brings us to talk about the presidency of theodore roosevelt. slide, ileave this want to point out that because of all the things we have been talking about, in 1903, the u.s. navy begins laying down two capital ships a year. this becomes the norm for the we arecade, so definitely at this point making a commitment to having a navy exerciseble to worldwide responsibilities, this defense andtal commerce trading -- this is gone after the spanish-american war. here is lady liberty trying on her new hat. we have a bayonet down here and a naval gun, so this is sort of united of empire for the states. theodore roosevelt, of course, famously, was a great friend of
the navy, had been the assistant secretary of the navy, was encouraged to keep doing that as the war of 1898 was breaking out because he was doing important work and people thought that if he was going to be somebody someday, he needed to stay in washington. of course, we all know he ignored that and went off and put the rough riders together. all that goodand stuff. but theodore roosevelt always had a soft spot in his heart for the navy, especially when he announced his roosevelt corollary to the munro doctrine. the monroe doctrine essentially says, "europe, please stay out of the western hemisphere. it is not open for colonization anymore," and the roosevelt corollary was "if there is any trouble in the western hemisphere, the united states ," and he care of it counted on his united states navy and his marines, for that matter, to do that. a nice picture that
essentially says what i've been saying. here goes naval expenditures, and here goes our strength of commission vessels all headed up as we move into the first decades of the 20th century. oh, here is our dreadnought battleship. in was actually commissioned 19 oh eight, but she has the very distinctive -- see, you can always tell a u.s. battleship by .er cage mass this is a gun spotting platform here. remember, i talked about the importance of seeing shots fall so you could commission changes to the guns. the british went with kind of a tripod-looking thing. brings us to the great white fleet. all right.
fleet, 1907 to 1909. 16 battleships, four squadrons, so for ships each. all have been commissioned within the last seven years, so they are all essentially .rand-new they are organized as the battle fleet of the united states navy. this is really one of the first this, i before i say should back up and say that in 1906, the united states navy anated its first fleets, and atlantic fleet on the east coast and a pacific fleet on the west coast, so this was the first time we had basically brought all of our ships together under a single fleet commander. but the great white fleet is organized as one battle fleet. for battleships, divisions, 14,000 officers and men, and over the course of 14 months, they traveled 45,000 miles.
it really was a spectacular display for a navy that is much as 30 years previous to that had supposedly only been in the business of coastal defense and commerce trading, and now, we are projecting power on a global scale. why did roosevelt what to send the great white fleet out other than to show off? i make the midshipmen learn -- and then i test them on it -- i make the midshipmen learn for reasons. the first is really to show off for the american taxpayers, quite frankly. tr loved a good show. worried about my time. i would like to address and tell the story of digging up john paul jones and bringing him to the naval academy and burying him in our chapel, but it was all who block area there was a parade. they turned out all the midshipmen. in bones john paul jones back from france.
it was all a show. tr was very into this kind of thing. he wanted the american public to be excited about this navy that they have been spending a great deal of taxpayer money on. he wanted to definitely warn the japanese in the pacific that the united states have the means and will to project power in the pacific. he wanted to exercise the capabilities of the united states fleet. i will return to this point when we begin to talk about the united state's action in the first world war because the are crucial in the first world war. about thisnot talk as much, but the british had been getting very cozy with the japanese. why? because the british wanted to bring a lot of their assets home because they are starting to worry about germany. so they would rather that other nations sort of took care of their peacekeeping duties that the royal fleet had been doing.
tr is trying to say to the british, "look, we would be a great ally in the pacific as well. we have the ability to project power like this. ook at our great white fleet." it is a big success for a number of reasons. beistics continue to problems that are never fully solved. calling is a problem that is never really solved until we start using fuel to power ships rather than coal, and coal engines are so inefficient. they got invaluable experience. think of these 14,000 offices and in listed personnel that are getting all this experience in ship handling, tactics, driving together, reading signals, figuring out what the signal means and what to do with your
ship. all of this stuff seems really easy, but it takes practice over and over again. they got to do a lot of that. out of the 14 months, they spent a couple of months doing gunnery practice, and they did a lot of it. they figured out that the great white fleet really ought to be gray, and they painted all the ships gray when they got home. they noticed that all the european people who were constantly worried about shooting at each other and were a little bit more battle ready than we were -- they noticed that their ships were all great. displacement and freeboard increased. that means ships got bigger. americans had a tendency to design ships that were kind of low to the water because we were in coastal defense. if you're not going out too far in the big blue ocean, kind of kind of good gun
platform, but they were terrible out on the high seas. we learned that we should build bigger ships that should sit on the water a little bit higher. the other thing i will just note in passing is many of you know the great white fleet gets home in 1909. dreadnought was launched in 1906. none of these ships were dreadnoughts. they are actually obsolete by .he time they got home some of them saw a little bit of action escalating convoys during the first world war, but in general, they never saw action. reorganization of the navy -- this is the slide where i would like to spend a little time talking about that problem that i brought up to you about 20 minutes ago. we've got a secretary of the navy. we got this navy that is growing and growing and growing. we have fleets, right?
not just squadrons. how do you administer something this big on a worldwide basis. josephus daniels was kind of it interesting character. a newspaper man i trade. very wealthy, politically corrected -- well, i'm sure he was politically corrected, but i meant to say politically connected. big supporter of wilson, so when wilson wins the election in 1912, he's offered the portfolio of secretary of the navy, and he jumps at it. he was a good progressive. what do we know about progressives? progressives love to use the government as a tool to try to foist things that they think are important on everyone else. this is exactly what good old josephus was doing. he envisioned this navy where we
could better all these bright, young enlisted people who were coming in, and we could teach them good, middle-class progressive values like hygiene and good eating and not smoking and not visiting prostitutes. navyhus daniel for bed the -- forbade the navy from passing out condoms anymore. the thing we probably know him best for was his ban on alcohol ,board united states navy ships something we have sort of rude -- rued ambersons. i am a huge coffee jerker, but when we talk about having a cup of joe, it's josephus daniels. he also was not interested in giving up any of his power.
drinker. huge coffee we talk about having this large fleet. we need a more efficient way to organize and manage this fleet. how are we going to do that? what we need is to have a general staff on the model of the russian staff system, right? the russians in the late 19th century have some great battle victories, right? these guys are just doing great things, so all the other militaries in the world were looking at their model and saying they had to put together their staffs like that. the army goes to a chief of staff with authority to give orders in 1903, but the navy does not.
the secretary of the navy continues to hold the authority and responsibility to give orders. withing that has to do organizational change or going joint or cooperating with people, then he becomes late to the party every time, and this was no exception. naval officers were continuing to press for this sort of thing, and josephus daniels did not want to give up his power, but unfortunately, the first world war was coming. , thisbegan to be prepared idea of a preparedness movement, we began to work on preparing for the first world war, josephus daniels realized we were going to have to have some sort of organizational structure that was modern. this guy was his aid for operations. his name is bradley fisk, who is another of these interesting characters. he was an innovator.
he actually invented a rangefinder, which you could use to estimate the range to enemy ships. kind ofe of these guys in on the ground floor trying to make our gunnery better. he had managed to make himself the aid for operations for the secretary of the navy, and he was the guy that was really pushing this staff reorganization idea, and of course, his vision was he would create a chief of naval operations, and it would be him. daniels and fisk did not get on at all. there's a number of reasons, but daniels just thought fisk was out to take some of his authority and power away from him and was probably correct. when we finally do get a chief of naval operations, it is admiral benson, who was selected daniels, largely
because vincent is a guy that will get in line and sort of keep his mouth shut, which is what josephus daniels wants. in 1950, we create the office of the chief of naval operations, which is our first step towards having a modern naval staff and having a uniformed officer who can actually issue orders to navy ships. we really are going to arrive at the first world war tonight. i promise. for everybody out there. when the first world war started in 1914, there was a lot of question about what side the united states was going to be on. we were not particularly friendly with great britain in 1914. not only that, but we had a massive german presence starting in pennsylvania and printing out across the top of the country through places like wisconsin,
outesota, etc. -- branching across the top of the country. grabstainly was up for who we were going to throw down u.s. are eventually, finding it increasingly profitable to sell stuff to the allies. by 1916, everyone in europe had run out of money. they had spent it all on the world's first industrial war. who do they turn to? they turned to the united states, who was only too happy to loan the massive amounts of by thesethey can go massive amounts of war material. they do not have any food because of the farm's blowup, so they are buying food from us. by 1916, wilson realizes that he cannot allow the allies to lose, right?
it is economically impossible. we are too deeply entangled. there's no way that they can lose. ofs, the german tactic unrestricted submarine warfare is sinking a lot of our american flag ships, which we had an issue with. most famously, of course, lusitania, which is some with some 129, i think, americans on board. by 1916, wilson, who is running for reelection on the slogan "he at the out of war" while same time -- by late 1916, wilson gets it, that we will have to become involved in the first world war. realizing that a powerful united states navy will be a must when it -- whatever the going toandscape is look like.
that leads us to the neglect of 1916, which is kind of misunderstood. when we talk about the preparedness movement, which is u.s. history,g in and people think it is being prepared to fight the first world war. not really. it is more about being prepared for what comes after. we knew the new world order was going to be different. if wilson wanted a seat at the table, we were going to have to have a strong and powerful united states navy to be able to play in whatever chaos was going to come out of the european war over there. and of course, jutland, which we , in maybout earlier 1916 just adds fuel to the fire. we are constantly worried about the germans coming down into the caribbean.
the naval act of 1916 calls for construction over the next three years of 10 battleships, six battle cruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 destroyers, and 67 submarines to be added to the. we authorize naval flying horse, naval reserves, and this, of was, is the title of the lecture. the united states and intent to an increased naval structure. second to none was aimed at the british. arrived at the first world war with approximately 15 minutes to go in the lecture, so i think we are doing good, right? this painting actually hangs in the superintendent's administration building at the academy. that's why i can use it here in this slide, because we own it, so no copyright problems. this painting is entitled "the
return of the mayflower," and it is the first six u.s. destroyers showing up in queensland, ireland, and 1917, the idea being that we have kind of returned. so what is the situation in april 1917? the situation is a lot worse than anyone had any idea. putting on a game face like things are going fine. everyone knows that we are stalemated in the trenches, so the real action is happening at sea, and the real action was submarines sinking merchant ships. that was the action. in april, they were moving toward losing 900,000 tons. it was unsustainable. the british thought they were probably going to have to ask for terms in november 1917. why is this?
the british were being typically british about their supply problem. aey had something called defensive routs theory, was went something like this. independent merchant ships should just steam independently because it would be harder for the u.s. to find them, and what was just a bloc off areas of the ocean and use destroyers and cruisers to take the fight to the u-boats. they wanted to be offenses -- offensive. they wanted to set of what we would call aviation kill boxes to coverdestroyers out them, and in that way, hopefully, knockback the u-boat threat. it was failing miserably. it was not working. killroblem is because this box theory, as i conveniently just named it, did not work .gainst submarines they were just too hard to find.
we did not have the technology to find them. remember so many slides ago lieutenant sims, the gunnery guy? well, here is admiral since -- admiral since -- admiral sims. it says april 1917, but he actually left in march. --sent, in civilian clothes he has called into the navy department and is handed a set of orders this is get over to england and find out what is going on. we think we are entering the war there shortly, start setting up cooperation with the royal navy, so he and his aides in civilian hop on a liner and head over to london, and what they find -- war was declared by the united states while sims was on route -- en route.
beatty, theadmiral guy from jutland. he is now the commander of the grand fleet, and admiral jellico, the guy from jutland, who was the commander of the grand fleet, is now first sea lord. essentially they are chief of naval operations. he is met by a special train. they whisk into london. he meets with admiral jellico, who lays out the numbers, and he says, "you guys are losing the war. none of us know this on that side. what are you going to do about this?" and they say, typical british stuff, "we are just going to keep doing the same thing we are doing." he says, "no, you are going to have to make some changes." i tell my students any time i start listing things, it means i'm setting up a test question. sims does two things.
the first is he insists they institute or at least try a convoy system. sounds jellico says it really defensive and not offensiveffense of -- . the second thing he does is wires back to the united states and says, "you need to send every single destroyer we have right now over to great, or they re going to lose the war." immediately, we begin mobilizing destroyers. there is a problem with that story. what did i tell you guys probably 10 slides ago about our ship construction? what were we busy building? battleships. why? because jutland showed us we needed to have battleships. battleships are important and they are cool. the american public loves them. naval war college, the only thing we talk about is
battleships on that floor i was talking about where we move battleships around all the time and that is the only thing we have. i'm using hyperbole. what we do not have is enough destroyers, really. we spent all the pre-world war i years fixated on the wrong weapons system. the weapons system that was killing the british was the submarine and we had a bunch of battleships that were worthless against submarines. nonetheless, we do send all the destroyers we do have, right? the sun was also a naval officer -- the son was also a naval officer. i have had many conversations with mrs. taussig, and they were
mostly one-way conversations. "yes, ma'am. yes, ma'am. yes, ma'am, i will absolutely make sure that happens." we institute this convoy system, we staff them up u.s. destroyers, and we begin to turn the tide on the loss of tonnage to german submarines. there are other reasons for that that i do not really have time to get into. .he idea of cube oats we sent out boats that looked like a merchant ship until the submarine surfaced to shoot at it, and that they would throw down the hatch covers, and out would come these guns, and they would blow up the submarine. you combine these things together, we begin to turn the tide. commander taussig very famously or very famously, at least, for naval officers,
perhaps less famously elsewhere -- it does not have the same damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead," but when asked be ready to go to see, he ays, "we are ready now, sir." admiral bailey says, "that's great. i'm going to give you four days before i send you to see." the reason they were ready to go was because of the crews of the great white fleet. they learned those lessons about maintenance, logistics, how to take care of their ships, and we had taken all the lessons of 1909 to heart and by 1917, the united states navy to how to go across the atlantic and be ready for combat immediately when they got over to the other side. that is kind of one major contribution of the united
states navy to the world war i .ar effort, our destroyers the instituted this convoy system, really helped turn the tide. convoy in their merchant ships essentially saved the british in the first will war. war.e first world there's no other way to put that, honestly. the other great and perhaps lesser-known -- because i mean, in general, if you approach people, you say world war i, submarines, and people say sinking all those ships, but people know less about the fact that the united states navy sent a squadron of title ships over to join and become part of the grand fleet -- a squadron of battleships over to join and become part of the grand fleet. this is admiral hugh rodman. they go over and join the british grand leet and become
designated battleship squadron six of the grand fleet. for the next two of years, year and a half anyway, they are part of the royal navy essentially. the uss new york, delaware, loretta, and wyoming -- new york, delaware, florida, and wyoming. i'm afraid there's no story about american battleships going toe to toe with german battleships, but what they did do was the addition of these for american dreadnought battleships gave the grand fleet numerical superiority over the high seas fleet which allowed the grand fleet to send people off to maintain their blockade of germany, which was extremely effective. of course, in the endgame of the the germans do not necessarily lose the first world war militarily. they loses because their political system comes apart and the kaiser has to abdicate, and
their people are all starving and rioting, and they eventually have to come to terms. they are not defeated on the battlefield, per se. you can draw that out to say that the addition of these or american battleships to the royal navy had a lot to do with that -- the addition of these 4 american battleships to the royal navy had a lot to do with that. in terms of developing tactics and the ability to fight as a fleet, these are things the united states navy -- the royal navy had an awful lot of experience in fleet fighting, but the united states navy had not. the hard work we have put into this stuff in the years between the spanish-american war and the worst world war were what resulted in our battleships' ability to go over and integrate almost flawlessly with the royal maybe -- the years between the
spanish-american war and the first world war. americans were not as good at were, and the british that was a lesson we took to .eart in the interwar era i tell my students that probably the most important thing the united states did in the first world war was brought to million members of the american expeditionary force to france and took them all home again and did not lose a single one of them. the u.s. navy's primary responsibility was to face the port of american troops. there were no losses on eastbound convoys. we lost three empty troop transports going back the other way. they were not regarded as heavily going back the other way. once the war ended, they had to bring everybody home. it was a massive undertaking and one that the u.s. navy and our merchant ships really did well.
at the end of the war, battleship division nine, as the high seas fleet arrived to be interned under the conditions of the armistice in november 1918, this is the german high seas fleet coming into scapa flow to be interned. if we were to continue, we would have to talk about the fact that rather than have their ships over to the british once the treaty of versailles had been signed, the german admiral had scuttled all his ships, and some at the bottomill today. it became the job of the navy to get everyone home from trance, which they did successfully, so what conclusions can we draw from this? the u.s. navy, quite frankly, derives surprisingly few lessons from its world war i experience. i would point out first of all that we continue to miss the summary. as many of you may know, we are
awful at developing torpedoes, so when the second world war starts, our torpedoes are notoriously terrible. our submarines keep shooting japanese ships, they keep going underneath the ship and not blowing up. we start from behind the curve in the world of submarines when we get to the second world war. harding, of course, runs for election under the slogan of "return to normalcy." students ask what normalcy is, and for harding, anything that is not woodrow wilson is normalcy. part of that was not spending the sort of money they were spending in 1916 and that they had proposed to spend in 1919. the naval act of 1919 got torpedoed along with america signing the treaty of versailles as we continue to sort of want
to return to this prewar era of not spending a lot of money on military stuff here he that, of course, leads to the washington naval conference of 1921, which was the world's first disarmament conference. the european powers were not interested in spending money because they did not have any because of the first world war, and, quite frankly, we did not have the political will to spend on military stuff, so everybody met and decided how many battleships they were going to sink or cut up or turn into reasonably -- turn into razor blades. we did not think nearly as much about submarines as we ought to have. think enough about naval aviation, we did not really envision the use of naval aviation in the way that we would see that it would be used in 1942 through 1945. in the interwar era, the navy returned to its peacetime role
of showing the flag. should leave half an hour for questions and answers, so i would like to say that that is pretty decent time management if you ask me. [applause] and i would be happy to take a few questions, or at least i'm told 30 minutes' worth at this point. yes, sir. >> [inaudible] dr. rentfrow: you know, the answer is right about this time, right? are really leading the way in this stuff, and they in being put on battleships 1915, 19 16, some of the very
earliest fire control computers. you know who was an expert on this stuff? my phd advisor, and i am not. essentially, what happens is the invention of the gyro. you get a device that can tell a rudimentary computer what your ship is doing, so it leads into a computer, and if you can get somebody in a platform to give you distance, which is relatively easy to do -- if you can get someone to give you distance and course of the enemy, and you plug that into the fire computer, that, coupled with the input it is getting from the gyro, that will then send a signal to the gun and tell it where to point. a shell is in the air for something -- depending on what your range is, a shell is in the air for something like 30 seconds, and sometimes even longer than that, so you are not shooting at the enemy ship. you are shooting at where the
enemy ship is going to be in 30 seconds, and that is a different thing, and those computers would have the ability to compensate for that. the very first rudimentary ones are coming right about during the first world war and continue to be improved in the interwar era. sir? >> [inaudible] >> the royal navy had their own basis. the royal navy had bases all over the place. we didn't have that. we had the philippines and that was about it. the white fleet did and what people in my book that is well was buying: the economy.
you would pull into port and load of coal with over vendor was happy to sell you coal. it works well for onesies and tuesdays. twosies. your grade point is well taken. in places where this may be could refuel. what fixes that is the fuel wall. >> [inaudible] >> you indicated [inaudible] what would you call the battle? >> i was throwing midway out as an example. that battle is certainly the they bought where
beyond visual aids. yes sir? >> they bought [inaudible] >> technology went to be guns and not armor. >> yes and yes. what specifically was wrong with the ships was the method they were using to reload the guns. before some of these sophisticated control systems, getting on target was difficult. salvoire a ranging
and adjusted based on where they shop. particularly, it usually took three salvos to get on target. the germans would take a three gunter at and let's see if i can do this with my fingers, one long, one short, and the middle gone they would fire at the best known range. the british were slow in getting on target. if you want to have an extremely long conversation about this, talk to my phd advisor. he will to you all about it. where i'm going with this is, in order to make up for that, they started cutting corners. they started stacking bags of stuff in the tourist so they can pump them in faster rather than them coming up one at a time from the protected powder magazine. when the german shells hit the and penetrated
hit it.ould that is what happened to all three ships. yes, ma'am? they were sharing military intelligence with the british. did the british navy chair all of the intel? >> yes. book, read admiral sim's it has issues because he is writing to make everything sound good, of course, but he will tell you in the book that when he showed up, the admiral says that americans get to see everything that we know about what is going on. that isays appreciated a gentleman. he thought that was the right way for the british to act. i don't think we had much they wanted to they had a lot of intelligence at that point.
an a hugeould be american presence [inaudible] >> the short answer to your question is, i don't know specifically very the longer answer is that i know that the naval act of 1919 called for a method building program so we weren't intending to stop. sir over here. >> is there any concept of why the navy throughout this and had an of session not calling anything about a field. -- battle cruiser. they said we were supposed to have battleships. i don't know specifically. weould hazard a guess that
were trying to get away -- we had been a cruiser navy. we were trying to get away from that. we wanted to have battleships. yes, sir? referring to the first time the fleet exercised in battle, which we exercising in battle [inaudible] modernant these battleships. there were fleets. it was from a different technological issue. -- era. we can develop that in a longer lecture but the scope scale and the aim of combat in the age of sail was completely different. it was a different kind of warfare. yes, sir. >> the intentions of the development was always relative to shooting [inaudible]
unnecessary that we didn't have one and they would be shooting at it. is there anything else you could do with a battleship? >> not really. not well. they were so expensive and so manpower intensive and took so -- theel, the really only thing -- and this is a point i make to my students, the first thing we called a battleship was the ss indiana launched in 1984. i was talking about, what does that tell you about the united states navy? battleship, i say, what is a battleship for? if they have been listening to my lectures about us service for shooting another ships. so what does that tell you about where the navy is going?
that means we have an office of capability instead of having coastal defense. >> [inaudible] >> the lack of americans like merchants ships is still a concern today. everybody put all this stuff another ships during the civil war and it's never really came back. was liberty program ships and they put these things together in three days. expert on the merchant marine, but they crank out an amazing amount of them. yes, sir? if the convoy system was so effective in the submarine threat from the germans, some years later, the summary threat newly won the war for them. what happened?
did they forget the lessons? >> submarines got better. when you study military history, it is a constant wave of offense and defense. if we figure out how to defend against something, the office has to get better. and so on and so forth. -- offense has to get better. to go to your questions, the summary got better. dieseling, better engines, stander what are longer, so they were a much more lethal threats. when the second world war broke out we had to relearn how to find them and fight them. eventually we do that. with the second world war, the first couple years are a mess. they are syncing everything. the tide doesn't turn until march of 1943. that is a combination of aircraft, something called the hedgehog, a better depth charge. direction finding and radar also.
once we relearn how to find these new and improved submarines and how to find the periscopes, that is the beauty of radars. we didn't have a rather could be mounted in a plane until later. people in the interwar. that were watching this through technological development and realizing that they had to start working real hard on a counter measure? >> that is a great question. all the people you were talking about work at the naval war college moving battleships around. it is a known discrepancy in our preparation for the second world war. >> [inaudible] >> i should explain that i don't use powerpoint when i liked her
to my students. i tell them i'm an old-fashioned professor. i'm going to talk, you're going to take notes, i will give you a test i'm not the best for powerpoint i put this together for you and that's why those white lines are in the design. that is what i chose. [laughter] i remember reading germany between the war had mess of research on submarines so essentially all problems that [inaudible] world >> i agree. it is always the strategy of the weaker nation -- navy. germany doesn't have a service maybe to speak of. it is always the strategy of the weaker navy to try to make up
with that another technological developments. certainly the development of the summary by the germans was good. >> [inaudible] >> get involved in what kind of land fight? >> [inaudible] we don't really develop an amphibious doctrine until the end of the war. we need an amphibious forces seize of the eyelids on the pacific and, block, block, blah. stars tohen our navy work with amphibious landings to provide cover for them very naval gunnery had been used
previous to this. i think of the british supporting amphibious landings with naval gunnery or even in the american civil war, certainly we were supporting particularly on the mississippi, thatu think of gunboats were supporting army operations as they march up the mississippi taking cities it's not that they didn't do that, but for the united states navy, the true development of doctrine where, this is what our ships will do and this is how it will support the fourth a chore, that is a 1920's, 1930's development. >> [inaudible] yes, sir. agreed.
>> could you say in hindsight that's maybe the naval act of 1919 was a good thing that has that itit would evolve would have had a horror lots more obsolete naval ships? >> sure. absolutely. the naval conference forces us factors.t those even though neville officers couldn't stand it, it was helpful. that's even though naval couldn't stand it, it was helpful. did that happen later between wars? >> it happened later. i can't think of anything specifically during the japanese
war that led the japanese to aviation. , obviously,you that they get really good at it. the thing that the japanese developed that we didn't until after the world war started was the ability to operate multiple carriers at the same time. we were still using our aircraft carriers and onesies or maybe twosies. the japanese understanding of a mobile striking force, the combined aircraft of six aircraft carriers against pearl harbor. we didn't have that capability then. that was something they locked onto. yes, sir? i wanted to mention my grandfather was in the war. olympia. with the
he was more in philadelphia. >> sure. when i was writing my book, i put on a flight suit and climbed around to look around at stuff. i was trying to figure out where all the suppose writing about was. i asked the guys of i could crawl around in it. he said sure. >> [inaudible] >> [laughter] yes, ma'am? >> in the naval battle between , wejapanese and the chinese were attacked by the british and 1993, combined forces in 1994, how much did we support [inaudible] how much did we support the japanese in preparing them and being supportive of the japanese? >> we support them?
>> [inaudible] >> not directly. i will tell you how we did support them. there were an awful lot of naval were notthat supporting the deputies that were trying to help the chinese have a modern navy. some butous among maybe not famous among the civilians. he was mischievous and got into a lot of trouble. he had gotten out of the american navy and had gone and sold his services to the chinese. he was at that special that you see. the american government wasn't providing any direct support that i'm aware of to the japanese. the japanese and british were very tight. they were buying the ships from the british, learning how to operate to them from the british . >> [inaudible]
can you elaborate on that a little bit? from my a student seminar that wrote a paper on this that he just turned and two weeks ago. development of terrorists. things,lem was two having the mechanisms to train them, so they were steam at first which was unwieldy. then, the other was weight. they were massively heavy. this gets back to the centerline discussion. where you put these massive heavy things that they want how to be top-heavy? they decided to put it on the sides of the ship to make it a stable as possible. beyond that, i'm not an expert on ship construction. everything you said was true. they were experimenting. >> [inaudible] >> yeah. right. a lot of them weren't even
interests. some were in open mountings. rets.ren't even in turn some were in open mountings. >> [inaudible] >> the top speed was 21 not. this is apples and oranges because it was much later with much improved steam plants. by the second world war, battleships were definitely notts.35 plus k that is just advances in technology. >> [inaudible] >> i certainly know we don't have any. renfro when on his mission on the uss iowa.
i think wisconsin was the last one we decommissioned. 1986.rt of making that up did you go to new york? the fleet thing? i was there for that. 1986. i was there as a 19 euros manment -- 19-year-old ship . i'm not aware of any battleships in the navy today. i look at my time here. i was told i have to end with a big cook was going to come out at 845. i think we've done pretty well. it has been a blast folks. you have been a great audience. thank you very much. [applause]